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The Problem: Background and History
Jowett (1987, 100-01) identifies two frustrations that have plagued the history of propaganda
analysis: (i) a lack of clear agreement upon what propaganda is; and (ii) the unsystematic and
unfocussed character of most propaganda studies. The second of these frustrations has been
partly remedied by a growing volume of theoretically enhanced publications since 1980. The
first of Jowett’s two deficits, however, still plagues propaganda analysis. In what has been called
“the century of propaganda” and the “age of propaganda” (Foulkes, 1983, 1; Herman, 1992;
Pratkanis and Aronson, 1991; Wilkes, 1998, 1-2) a great deal of confusion--and even
incoherence--surrounds the notion. Indeed, some have questioned, and others deny the very
utility of the idea of propaganda. I argue in this paper that much of this theoretical disarray is
traceable to a history of inadequate notions of propaganda, and that philosophical analysis
greatly enhances our understanding of propaganda by disclosing its epistemological foundations.
Most of us already have what philosophers call a ‘notion’, a notional understanding or broad
impression of what ‘propaganda’ stands for. Such an impression would include many or most of
the following features: self-serving reports; lies, distortions, fabrications, exaggerations, bullshit;
disinformation; selective disclosures and censorship; “spin” or spin-doctoring, loaded words,
slanted language; mass persuasion, belief manipulation, impression management, ideological
injection, bias; public relations [PR]; much or most advertising, campaign rhetoric, and probably
more than a little education; religious discourse; rumors and gossip. Many of us probably assume
that behind the scenes, controlling the message’s content, are groups and individuals who are
cunningly adept at directing all these messages to mass, faceless audiences which are, to a
considerable degree, porous, highly impressionable, supine. At the same time, however, more
than a few of us like to think that, in our own mind, we are relatively impervious to most of these
persuasive strategies--or at least not as susceptible as others. (However, beware! Ellul [1973, 76,
111, 113] claims that intellectuals and the educated are especially susceptible to its influence.)
Propaganda as we have come to know it really began with World War I. Before the term
was used infrequently (and this is why Ellul [1967, 5] is insistent that propaganda is really a 20th
century phenomenon.) However, its spin-off, propaganda analysis and commentary, quickly
attained a critical mass by the early 1930s. Most of this literature is dedicated to propaganda
history including manifold case studies of wartime practices, persuasion techniques, and
psychological studies of persuasion effects. While brief descriptions and definitions of
propaganda abound, there have been relatively few treatments that essay, in any kind of
systematic fashion, to lay out the idea or concept of propaganda. On the contrary, most accounts
either assume that the reader already understands the term, or they tend to posit some relatively
undeveloped, ad hoc notions, and then go on from there to describe this or that instance of
propaganda. Sometimes a book will include ‘propaganda’ in its title without ever pausing to
supply a description of the term or protocols for its use (e.g., Keshen, 1996); and this lapse only
serves as one more indication that there has been a noticeable paucity of dedicated theoretical
treatments of propaganda.
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The enduring confusion about propaganda was articulated in a colloquium authored a dozen
years ago by the editors of Propaganda Review entitled “What is Propaganda Anyway?”
(Darnovsky et al., 1989) The colloquium took off from the premises that “propaganda is a
slippery concept, difficult to define”, and that “propaganda has lost much of its meaning” (pp. 67). What is just as interesting about this kind of exercise and a few others like it, moreover, is
that the propaganda theorists who have set themselves to wrestle with the challenge have not
allowed themselves to be discouraged by the concept’s elusiveness. They have simply assumed
that getting clear about the notion is part of their task. Much more uncomfortable than
complaints about the broadness of the concept, however, is the charge that the value of the idea
of propaganda is, at best, secondary to that of ideology (Selucky, 1982), or that it lacks any
utility and substance (Allen, 1993; Rohatyn, 1988).
Psychologizing Propaganda
In a series of exemplary historical studies, Sproule (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1994, 26-32; 1997)
has shown that one way to repudiate the concept of propaganda was by gradually minimizing it
and then ignoring it. One of the ways this was done was through “the scientific response”—
concentrating, that is, upon experimental, observational and survey studies of persuasion effects,
to the exclusion of reformist and humanist social concerns which had originally motivated the
scientific examinations. Impressed by the obvious impact of WWI propaganda, early socialscience researchers (in the fields of psychology, sociology and political science) undertook
manifold series of effects studies. Not surprisingly, the language and methods of psychology
dominated these early research and theorizing studies. This kind of scientific ‘operationalization’
which concentrated upon measurable effects succeeded in shifting attention away from the
broader canvas of propaganda--in effect, denying its very existence both as a complex social
phenomenon and, a fortiori, its utility as an interpretive idea. 1
There were other transforming influences as well. During the 1940s and early 1950s, as the
quest for mobilizing public opinion and securing social consensus grew within the American
military, government and corporate sectors, the media and mass communication came to be
increasingly viewed as benign instruments of democracy. By contrast, the earlier (admittedly,
alarmist) style of propaganda analysis among humanist scholars and writers (including John
Dewey, Walter Lippmann and Upton Sinclair) which had always viewed propaganda as antidemocratic, became itself suspect because it was now seen as an obstacle to social unity and
conformity through the credo of influential communication. Sproule (1989b) writes: “the 1940s
saw a consensus emerge that propaganda analysis was dangerous because of its socially divisive
tendencies. Reflecting the new era of consensus, academic researchers on social influence
turned, after 1939, from problems of helping the public analyze propaganda to the imperative of
assisting governmental institutions fight propaganda battles abroad and at home” (p. 237, italics
1 Sproule (1989b) shows that the myth of the “magic-bullet” has grown up around these early research
developments. The myth posits both powerful media effects and a kind of pure empirical intent behind these early
research enterprises, an intent that overlooks the underlying socio-ethical and reformist motives that spurred many
of these early scientific researchers. In any case, the magic-bullet myth has done much to reinforce these
transformations: it did much to denigrate the reputation of earlier humanistic-style propaganda analysis and, over
several decades, it served to steer American students of communication studies into other research directions,
including, one might add, a later (and reactive) preoccupation with ideology and hegemony.
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added). Small wonder, then, that propaganda studies, with occasional exceptions (e.g., Ellul,
1957;1973 [1965]), disappeared for as long as it did from front-line academic research between
the 1950s and the 1980s. Sproule (1994, 1) remarks upon “the disappearance of propaganda as a
significant theoretical term in American social sciences and its replacement with the more
euphemistic concepts of communication and persuasion.”
Contributing to this reduced visibility was propaganda’s status as a theoretically
undeveloped notion, a deficit that is still evident in the recently published Encyclopedia of
Propaganda (Cole, 1998): the propaganda theory section (vol. 3, 615-18) does little more than to
briefly annotate what have now become conventional transmission-models of communication in
the language of stimulus-response, powerful and limited effects, uses and gratifications, and
measurable attitude-change--all heavily psychologically structured.
Psychological imperialism could already be glimpsed in the title of Biddle’s 1931 article, “A
Psycholgical Definition of Propaganda”. But its full force was made explicit in another article,
“Towards a Definition of Propaganda” (1943), when its author, Henderson, remarked that the
definition of propaganda must move away from the practice of positing what he called “content
definitions” that tended to be largely intuitive in what they selected as definientes. Henderson
insisted that a satisfactory definition had to meet two requirements. First, it “must he
psychological, or at least socio-psychological, rather than sociological or axiological” ; second,
the “definition must look to method as the differentiating factor and must apply the term
propaganda to a method, not a content” (pp. 71, 74; italics added). Henderson’s eagerness to
link propaganda analysis to method is certainly commendable. At the same time, however, it’s
apparent that the method Henderson had in mind should be one that would disclose the dynamics
of persuasion by identifying the psychological features involved in pressuring the “victim” to
“come across” in the shortest possible time.
Overt preference for the methods and language of psychology--borrowing a label from
Husserl and Frege, l have called it ‘psychologism’--continued to manifest itself as the dominant
research perspective in the subsequent decades. At the same time, propaganda study was
progressively assimilated by the language and models of the emergent discipline of
communication studies. Thus, it became standard procedure to concentrate upon persuasion
largely as a function of communication, and then to conceptualize communication, in a linear,
mechanistic fashion, as a “process by which an individual (the communicator) transmits stimuli
(usually verbal) to modify the behavior of other individuals (the audience)” (Hovland, Janis &
Kelley, 1953, 12). This sort of perspective continues more or less to show itself in Silverstein’s
(1987) enthusiasm over “reformulating a science of propaganda as a sub-discipline of political
psychology” (p. 49). Psychologism and its empirical bias is still very much evident in Partkanis
and Aronson’s Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion (1991) when
the authors define propaganda in terms of agreeable cognitive responses, and also when they
confidently assert that ”persuasion is no more mysterious than a household lamp” (p. 25).
Even when Erwin Fellows in “Propaganda and Communication: A Study in Definitions”
(1957) undertook to ground the dynamics of propaganda in the language of the dominant
communication model of the time--“who says what to whom with what effect”, “why is it
said…and how is it said?”--the result was still very much dominated by the biases and language
of empirical-behaviorist psychology. That bias has never really much changed. Psychologism
may appear to be less overt, but it is certainly no less operative in, contemporary treatments of
propaganda by communication scholars. For instance, in Jowett and O’Donnell (1992, 18-35),
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the notions of persuasion and propaganda are developed in terms of such metaphors and features
as: transfer and transaction; stimulation and stimulus situation; response and response
modification; motivation, attitude change; satisfaction of needs and wants; resonance. The
upshot of all this is that the reality of propaganda is commonly framed in terms of belief
manipulation and attitude changes, and clothed in the language of psychology, and physical
metaphors.
These sorts of accounts--structured in terms of persuasion effects, the nomenclature of
psychology and simplistic communication divisions--left researchers with little more than
superficial notions of propaganda. Moreover, these notions have a way of graduating into
outright incoherence. Incoherence manifests itself in a number of treatments which fail to
distinguish between the concept of propaganda and the concepts of information or
communication--a failure, once again, that stems from working with inadequate notions of
propaganda. For both Rohatyn (1988) and Edelstein (1997), whatever we say about propaganda
is itself indistinguishable from propaganda so that we unavoidably wind up with propaganda
about propaganda--hardly instructive! Hummel and Huntress (1949, 3) represent the most
outrageous form of incoherence when they write (or imply) that (all) scientific and mathematical
discourse is propaganda, and that “a fish that imitates a rock in order to lure its luncheon a little
closer is a propagandist….both fish and physicist are propagandists.” To fully appreciate the
degree of offence, let me just add that the Edelstein (1997) and Hummel and Huntress (1949)
notions are posited as early premises in books dedicated to propaganda analysis
Commentaries such as these manifest the bankruptcy of the idea of propaganda, a
bankruptcy directly traceable to a sequence of research and (anti-) theoretical deficits. The
message deeply embedded within that history is that propaganda, described in quasimechanistic (stimulus and response) and consequentialist language, should be thought of along
the following lines:
1) Propaganda is a precipitate of discrete psychological events and persuasion
effects, including behavior (rituals, demonstrations, marches and picketing).
2) Propaganda also comprises independent artifacts--images, texts, slogans, film,
music--well distanced from what I will argue shortly are their originating
epistemological conditions.
3) Within that array of largely psychological and physical effects, the dominant
image of propaganda processes is one that is concentrated in opinions or belief
states, and in the manipulation and reinforcement thereof.
4) Another deeply embedded pre-conception seems to be at work here. Since
information, knowledge and understanding entail belief states, the assumption
seems to lurk that we can’t really perceive or formulate very much of a
distinction between the purely doxastic features of consciousness (belief,
opinion, point of view) and the more hefty features of information, knowledge,
and understanding--or, at least in the context of propaganda belief-mechanism,
that we can’t really tell or identify what that difference looks like.
5) When distanced from their deeper epistemological determinants, the
psychologized notions of propaganda predictably take on an ethically neutral
cast--an almost universal assumption in persuasion-effects research and most
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propaganda analysis. (See Fellows, 1955, 186-188; Sproule, 1989a, 15; Qualter,
1985, 108; Philip Taylor, 1998, xv)
Moving on to the Philosophical Plane
Definitions of propaganda tend to centralize such commonplace notions as belief,
opinion, attitude reinforcement, thought control, deception and lies. But even though an
intimate connection is made between propaganda and one or more of these, as psychological
states or episodes, scarcely any attempt has yet been made to systematically analyze propaganda
in terms of its epistemological status. With rare exceptions (Alex Carey, 1997, 75-84; Ellul,
1957 , 1973; Combs and Nimmo, 1993), propaganda theorists have systematically ignored this
dimension. That neglect is curious because use of the word ‘propaganda’ is already a statement
abut the defective quality of information transmitted, received and believed, and its suspect
purposes. What is still missing is a more developed picture of the complex interplay between
propaganda and truth, the use of facts and information, propaganda’s preferred relationship to
belief, and its impact upon mind. In short, there is a need to move beyond manipulation-based
notions of propaganda, framed in the language and theory of psychology, to accounts which can
supply us with a more refined understanding of the epistemic conditions that constitute
propaganda. Quite simply we have reached the point at which there is a pressing need for an
epistemology of propaganda.
Propaganda and information
The close relationship between information and propaganda has been described most
chillingly by Jacques Ellul (1957; 1973) when he observes that in modern technological society,
information and propaganda “cannot be separated from one another” and insists upon “the
impossibility of clearly distinguishing between propaganda and information” (1957, 62, 67;
italics added). To some (Steinfatt, 1979; Selucky, 1982, 6; Jowett and O’Donnell, 1992, ix) the
claim seems tautological or, at least, unworkable; but it’s important to understand what Ellul is
and is not saying. He is not saying that the concept of propaganda is the same as the concept of
information. What he is saying is that in practice it is difficult if not impossible for the average
person to distinguish between the two.
Ellul’s ‘indistinguishability thesis’ summarizes a motif within news analysis that runs
through most of this century from the early warnings of Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion
(1922) to the present. During the 1990 Gulf War, Philip Knightly posed the dilemma in these
words: “So how can the ordinary newspaper reader and television viewer distinguish the news
from the propaganda? The answer is that he cannot.” (as quoted in Taylor, 1992, 24). In nearly
as global a fashion, Herman and Chomsky (1988) apply their five-filter model of propaganda to
characterize the entire U.S. news-media industry. The same sort of identity or confusion is
regularly affirmed in international radio broadcasting ( Bethel, 1982, 24; Wasburn 1992, 85).
In peace and wartime, propaganda agencies regularly title themselves as offices, ministries or
bureaus of information—a euphemism that tends to both neutralize and to disguise their dark
side.
There is yet another dimension to the indistinguishability or inseparability thesis, this time
more from the perspective of the message-transmission or propagandist himself. This time, Ellul
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(1957) underscores the necessity of information as an enabling pre-condition of propaganda ever
taking hold. An uninformed audience is not one that is likely to accept the message. Just as the
prior dissemination of information is needed to generate public opinion, a generalized awareness
of issues, so too it is the sine qua non for the existence of propaganda:
Propaganda means absolutely nothing unless information has been at work beforehand….For
actually it is information that creates the problems that propaganda will exploit and to which
it will claim to offer solutions. Indeed, propaganda exists only when a totality of acts has
become in the eyes of those who constitute opinion, a problem. (pp. 71-72)

A seamless continuum unfolds within this kind of situation. Propaganda in its earlier and
disposing stages, what Jowett and O’Donnell (1992, 15-17) call both “subpropaganda” and
“facilitative communication”, sets the agenda by naming the issues. Indeed, agenda-setting
theories of the media and the press (wherein the media map out the broad contours of our public
awareness and the boundaries of our consciousness without really generating much in the way of
understanding and explanation) are literally textbook examples of alternative communication
concepts and theories which now stand in for the kind of influence-analysis that used to be done
in earlier kinds of propaganda analysis (Mander in Wilke, 1998 , x; Sproule, 1989, 227.)
Propaganda and Mind
The propaganda-information symbiosis does not end here. There exists a considerable body
of literature affirming the influential role exercised by the information industries in our
technologically dominated societies--or technopolies--both in shaping the propagandee’s
cognitive appetites, and in supplying instructionally inferior information--‘infotainment’--to
assuage these appetites: E.g., Combs and Nimmo, 1993; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Mitroff
and Bennis, 1989; Parenti, 1993; Postman, 1979, 1985, 1993. Descriptions repeatedly
underscore the debilitating power of propaganda and its deliberate promotion of irrationality and
anti-rationality. In Ellul’s (1973) unnerving scenario, the modern deluge of information, while
it may prompt some awareness, does not really instruct, but simply overwhelms, ultimately
disabling the public:
[M]uch of the information disseminated nowadays—research findings, facts, statistics,
explanations, and analyses--eliminate personal judgment and the capacity to form one’s
own opinion even more surely than the most extravagant propaganda…excessive data do
not enlighten the reader or the listener; they drown him….And because rational
propaganda thus creates an irrational situation, it remains above all propaganda—that is
inner control over the individual…(p. 87)

Ellul’s portrait (1973, 138-160) of the symbiotic linkage between information and
propaganda is predicated on a vision of the moral and psychological weakness within the modern
citizen who both welcomes and embraces simple nostrums. “[Most people] are ready to accept
propaganda that will permit them to participate and which hides their incapacity beneath
explanations, judgments and news….The great force of propaganda lies in giving modern man
all-embracing, simple explanations and massive, doctrinal causes without which he could not
live with the news.” (pp. 140, 146). Ellul (1973) identifies the propagandee’s need “not to be
just…but to seem just, to find reasons for asserting that one is just….This corresponds to man’s
refusal to see reality--his own reality…(p. 155). Collectively, then, the epistemological frailties
(and moral weaknesses) of many isolated individuals add up to a social pathology that both
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enables and invites the soothing ministrations of what Edelstein (1997) calls “mediaprop” and
‘infoprop’. Nor is Ellul’s portrait dated. Daniel Boorstin (1971) said much the same sort of
thing about the addictive power of images as a form of propaganda; and the culture of “palaver
“--unserious, beguiling media-chatter--described by Combs and Nimmo (1992) is yet another
aspect of the same scenario. More recently, Cohen and Metzger (1998) record conceptions of
the public’s thirst for “ontological security” through the intersection of “social affiliation” and
the mass media, especially TV.
But while stereotypes, myths and self-sealing beliefs sound like serious defects, a number of
propaganda and communication theorists, moving beyond communication content and items,
prefer to underscore the structural and agentic impairments to reason itself. Ellul (1973, 169187), for example, describes how propaganda short-circuits critical thinking, renders analysis and
reflection superfluous, and seeks to induce action, adherence, and participation with as little
thought as possible (p. 180). Terence Moran (1979, 187-89), using the criteria of thinking
practices, symbolic systems, and appeals, distinguishes between genuine communication and
propaganda--which he calls “pseudocommunication.” In genuine communication, he writes,
“the thinking tends to be individual and critical”, and appeals are rational, with an emphasis on a
clear relationship between the message and supporting data.” By contrast, in propaganda,
thinking is collective, uncritical, and the sender exercises control over both the information flow
and analysis; and appeals are now largely emotional, not rational. Propaganda manifests itself,
then, not simply in the content of particular beliefs or skewed attitudes, but more radically in the
impairment of the mind’s operations, and in a retreat from communication.
Something of this can be glimpsed in Gauthier’s (1994) diagnoses of impaired- reasoning
techniques in the context of negative political advertising. More precisely, he analyzes
referential structures used in French-language TV ads designed to discredit political opponents,
their parties an platforms, during the 1993 Canadian federal elections. Gauthier finds that the
referring expressions, used as simple descriptions, often have the feel of an argument, and can
easily induce inferences. In reality, they are little more than suggestions and undeveloped
affirmations. The referring expressions, often vague or abstract, may be self-referential and
favorable (e.g., “new party”, “new blood”, “fresh ideas”); or the referring text may also be just
the camera image, combined with a slogan or jingle, expressing certain values and ideals: job
creation, the greatness of Canada, hope. Gauthier calls these kinds of self-reference “pure”
reference “which does not serve any reasoning of any kind: it is posited and justified by itself”
(p. 103). There are also opponent-directed, negative references (e.g., “old parties”; the “failures”
of other systems or parties; “inconsistency”; the vulnerable portions of an opponent’s platform)
in which the identify of defective opponents is left unclear: “those who [ceux qui] plunged
thousands of people into poverty.”
Gauthier’s central point is that these kinds of ambiguous unfinished references reinforce
various modes of adversarial arguments, historically identified as fallacious reasoning. The do
so as “referential argumentation”—that is, as highly suggestive utterances, descriptors or images
that pose as arguments in themselves and which invite us to complete an intended line of
inference. They are effective because the listener or viewer is nudged to complete an intended
argument or supply a conclusion, and does it without realizing that he or she is doing so. In this
way, the persuadee actively participates in his own self-persuasion with no sense of imposition.
Like (or as) enthymeme-induced persuasion, then, referential argumentation is virtually
imperceptible, comfortable, and extremely effective. (For Gauthier this is reason enough to
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condemn referential argumentation as inherently unethical [p. 108], another philosophical
contact point worth considering later.)
Propaganda, Truth and Credibility
The term ‘disinformation’, now widely used as a synonym for propaganda, symbolizes the
epistemic contradiction that lies at the heart of most propaganda. In some ways it is a more
useful descriptor than ‘propaganda’ because it signalizes if not factual falsity, at leas the falsity
of intent within the propaganda enterprise at the same time as it refers to the feature of
information exchange. According to Ellul (1973, 53, 58), the propaganda enterprise is inherently
dishonest in its intent. Even so, it is widely recognized among the propagandists themselves that
the success of disinformation campaigns is proportional to the degree in which correct
information is communicated (Bittman, 1985, 49, 56; Katz, 1982, 50-51). Melor Sturua (in
Lapham, 1984), a one-time U.S.-based Soviet correspondent, put this point about the use of truth
as well as anyone when he stated: “For propaganda to succeed, the fact itself must be true. If the
fact is true, then it is possible to believe the interpretation.”
Once again, however, propaganda runs more deeply than just the manipulative use of bits of
information and belief. The propagandist’s attitude towards the use of truths and falsity is
inherently equivocal and ruthlessly expedient. He will use either one depending upon which is
most likely to succeed, but he or she prefers to work with truth. Truth enhances the credibility of
both the message and its sources whereas falsity, if unmasked, threatens both of these as well as
the effectiveness of the propagandist’s efforts. Leo Bogart (1976, 128-41) uses the phrase
“strategy of truth” to underscore the pragmatic attitude of the USIA during the Cold War, and
WWII American film propagandists in general. In the journalism and PR sectors, Fox (1999, 84112) highlights “congenial truth”, the stock-in-trade of spin-doctors, as being a “pact between the
reporters and the reader, an understanding of reality that is mutually agreeable” but which, often
as not, is far removed from reality (pp. 104-105).
Since the concept of propaganda, not unlike deception and distortion, and propaganda
analysis logically presuppose a concept of truth, I need to pause briefly here in order to clarify
what I mean by the concepts of truth and its allied virtue of truthfulness. I use the word ‘truth’ to
mean an agreement (conformity, accord, match, fit) between what is thought, believed, judged
and uttered (the representation, statement, proposition or report) and what is the case--that, is, the
real situation or state of affairs in the (extra-mental) world. By ‘truthfulness’ I mean the enduring
disposition or commitment to utter true statements and reports. Traditionally referred to as the
‘correspondence” or “conformity” theory of truth, this is the concept of truth that is always
presupposed in propaganda analysis and commentary. The consistency or coherence concept of
truth (which names the accord between [systems of] statements or reports) is also relevant, but I
take it to be ultimately secondary to the correspondence theory. While Alex Carey (1997, 75-84)
also remarks upon “the remarkable correspondence in attitude to truth between pragmatists and
propagandists”, it’s important to appreciate that the pragmatism he focuses on is ground-level
expediency at the level of the practitioner’s attitude or treatment.2

2

Carey’s use of the words ‘pragmatism’ and ‘pragmatic’ to describe propaganda’s relationship to truth
requires qualification. By virtue of its simplistic utilitarianism, ‘mere expediency’ or ‘expedient’ might be more
appropriate. Propaganda’s pragmatism is not at all like the socially attuned consequentialism of mainstream
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The propagandist is totally unconcerned with the value of truth-as-correspondence, let alone
with truthfulness--except as tools or strategems that might be exploited. There is nothing then of
the serious effort and moral commitment that Lorraine Code (1987) identifies in the enterprise of
knowing well: “A kind of normative realism constitutes the implicit ideal of good knowing at the
core of correspondence and coherence theories of truth and knowledge, too. Although actual
correspondence relations are difficult, if not impossible, to establish, sustaining the effort to do
so as well as possible is a mark of virtuous intellectual conduct” (p. 131) Hence, the full weight
of truthful communication manifests itself not just in particular episodes of telling the truth, but
in a more extended fashion as the practice and pattern of assembling reports with whatever
degree of care, evidence and rigor they require.
Now, the propagandist exempts himself from this value-system of truth, truthfulness and
“virtuous intellectual conduct.” In propaganda, the truth is regularly reduced to the status of
what is merely expedient or useful, to a means. This radical inversion of an historically
cherished value3 is disconcerting enough in itself, but it is all the more so when it parades under
the guise of objectivity and strict methodology. Such ruses have been convincingly illustrated in
the context of organizational communication. In Bureaucratic Propaganda (1980), authors
Altheide and Johnson provide a well documented case that the organizational report has become
the principal unit of propaganda on the contemporary scene. Such reports, whether drafted by
military, governmental, religious, social-service or media agencies are primarily self-serving
accounts which aim to enhance and justify an organization’s behavior to its intended readership.
Even though they ostensibly rely upon statistics and acknowledged methodologies, virtually
none of the reports examined by the authors supplied any indication about how the reports
themselves were compiled, nor why one interpretation of the facts was adopted rather than
another. Facts, numbers and percentages abound, but the rationales behind the various
interpretations are muted. On the contrary, it becomes apparent that the reports studied by
Altheide and Johnson were intended primarily not to publish the truth about the organization
itself, but to persuade relevant persons and publics. Equally transparent is the systematic
manipulation of statistics in such a way as to clothe organizational reports with an aura of
rationality and scientific objectivity. Within all of this, Altheide and Johnson acutely identify the
nearly imperceptible declension of truth from an end to a means:

philosophical pragmatism. See, for example, Christopher Lyle Johnstone (1983) “Dewey, Ethics and Rhetoric:
Toward a Contemporary Conception of Practical Wisdom,”, Philosophy and Rhetoric,16, 185-207.
3

In today’s climate of postmodernism and deconstructionism, there is no longer unanimous agreement on the
primacy of truth, let alone correspondence-truth as a primary communication value. George Steiner (1975, pp. 110235), for instance, champions the human ability to dissemble and falsify as “crucial both to human liberty and to the
genius of language” (p. 223). David Nyberg (1993) argues that deception is rooted in our nature, and often a good
thing. No surprise, then, when Oliver Thomson (1999) insists that the “human species is a natural propagandist”,
and that our “basic instinct to propagandize” is “as innate as a peacock’s display of its feathers” (p. 327, italics
added). Even within the enterprise of media criticism, there has been an erosion of the conventional ideas of truth
and truthfulness as standards of media performance (Cunningham, 1986; McConnell, 1990). For Combs and
Nimmo (1993, pp. 217-222), postmodernism and post-structuralism greatly blur the boundary lines between
propaganda and communication , and also the outlines of conventional truth-based propaganda analysis. Deborah
Lipstadt (1993) views postmodern epistemological relativism as a powerful ally of so-called revisionist (Holocaust)
history and of the hate propaganda that it constitutes and serves.
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What has been overlooked is the essential aspect of propaganda--the practical use of
information…. The practical use of truth is characteristic of most organizations in our
modern age….Bureaucratic propaganda uses truth for organizational goals. (p. 23)

This instrumentalization of truth reveals an epistemological warp, but it is also something
more than that. First, Altheide and Johnson see it is a necessary or defining condition of
bureaucratic propaganda. Second, it is a moral inversion as well since the reports themselves, in
a very concrete way, transform the order of ends into that of mere utility. Epistemic goals and
excellences , such as information and truth, pose as little more than mere strategies. I will only
suggest here that this is one of several reasons to conclude that propaganda is generally an
inherently unethical enterprise requiring another kind of philosophical analysis.
Another way to say all this is that credibility--better still, the state of actually being
believed--is secured at the price of truth. The commonplace observation that propaganda instills
beliefs or modifies perceptions is not incorrect, but rather incomplete. The mere presentation of
messages or images is not enough to persuade unless the audience assents, and the audience
assents only when the message and/or its sources inspire trust and credibility; and this is often
why propaganda sources are hidden or suppressed (and called ‘black propaganda’). In the
context of military propaganda, McLaurin (1982, 107) writes, “credibility is the immediate
operational goal of PSYOP [i.e., psychological warfare]. All PSYOP seeks to establish
credibility of the message, of the communicator, or, usually and implicitly both..” Indeed,
credibility very quickly assumes top priority in the propagandist’s scheme of values, but its
dependency upon the use of truth is no less axiomatic:
The PSYOP issue is that the technique of waging a campaign of psychological warfare
depends upon the slow building of acceptance by the audience, so it follows that truth is
the most important ingredient. Such truth, to be sure, can, and sometimes must be
selective, for often the truth is not credible. (Katz, 1982, 46)

The propagandist, then, will tend to prefer credibility to the dissemination of truth if
confronted by a choice between the two. Daniel Lerner (1980), in the context of discussing the
“strategy of truth” recounts a graphic incident in World War II which illustrates this point:
As the touchstone of credibility became axiomatic in allied propaganda technique, some
true stories were not told because they would not be believed. For example, photographs
of German prisoners eating oranges in allied POW camps were eliminated from
propaganda leaflets on the ground that disbelief among German soldiers (who had not
seen an orange in years) would compromise the credibility of the leaflets as a whole. (p.
387)

The same kind of preference for credibility over truth is recorded in Leo Bogart’s (1976)
analysis of the USIA’s philosophy of reporting during the Cold War:
The “truth” may be misleading. A foreign policy that really makes sense may be harder
to propagandize that a dishonest or unsound position. It is apt to be more complex, hence
less plausible….Films or books that are “overly realistic” about American \life, such as
[James Jones’] From Here to Eternity, may be alright for an American audience but
unsuitable overseas. Presenting a problem may (a) eclipse the solution and (b) serve the
ends of Soviet propaganda. (p. 132)

In practice, then, propaganda and its agents prefer the lesser epistemic values of credibility
and actual belief to those of, say, knowledge and understanding. Truth, at best, is only a
strategy, a tool, but it has no special value apart from its utility. Hence, the virtue of truthfulness
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or honesty also has no merit for the propagandist other than as a Machiavellian pose that
promotes credibility and prompts assent. At the same time, we should remain mindful of
enabling conditions within audiences. Combs and Nimmo (1993) view a number of dispositions
within the audience as important elements in the persuasion process. Among them, they single
out (pp. 13-14) the habit of credulity, people’s “ready openness to suasion and their lack of
critical acumen,” as an important seedbed within which propaganda takes root. “It is our
contention,” they write, “that propaganda germinates, flourishes, and thrives best with those who
practice the habit of credulity.” Hence the importance of myth, they write (pp. 86-94), which as
a vehicle of belief commands a convincing force as “a story truer than reality” (p. 87).
The Para-epistemics of Credibility and Credulity
I have been arguing that the phenomenality of propaganda needs to be analyzed from an
epistemological perspective in terms of the use of truth and information, credibility, audience
credulity, and the profound inversion of truth values that the former entail. Propaganda literature
documents that any number of media, techniques, devices--including myth, stereotypes, history,
entertainment--continue to bring about this state of affairs. Very briefly I want to indicate how a
support system of para-epistemic agencies and devices figure in this wholesale transformations.
By ‘para-espistemic’ I mean an array of talents, practices, research enterprises, rhetorical ploys,
institutions and settings that propaganda sources exploit or within which they embed messages in
order to secure success. They are often mentioned in propaganda analysis, and so we tend to
take them for granted. What is less clearly articulated is the kinship these para-epistemic
elements have to the inherently epistemological core of propaganda. Because the philosophical
approach to propaganda discloses the epistemological roots of propaganda, it enables us to
appreciate more deeply the congruity and intimate connection that many of these para-epistemic
devices exercise upon the persuasion process.
For instance, McLaurin’s (1982) handy compendium of U.S. military propaganda studies
describes a number of research and analytical programs designed to enhance wartime military
intelligence in the area of PSYOP operations. Outside the wartime and Cold-War contexts,
however, I would like to just briefly indicate how another kind of research organization functions
as para-epistemic agencies to reinforce the epistemic layering at the core of propaganda.
Think tanks enter into the picture as a powerful para-epistemic instrument. Among the
approximately 12,000 think tanks now operating in the United States (and the 100 or so in
Canada), a number have clearly emerged as effective sources both of commercial corporate
influence and of political advocacy (Abelson, 1995, 93-126; Alex Carey, 1997, 90-108). Carey
(p. 91) speaks of “a quite new emphasis on promoting and disseminating their products
nationwide--that is, on proselytizing.” Set up as generously funded, tax-deductible research
agencies, these think tanks engage scholars and writers to assemble academic studies with which
they then flood the policy arena. More specifically, they provide these materials, including
newspaper columns and releases, to targeted readerships--government leaders and policy makers
and news media. In this manner, they function primarily as what Carey calls “treetopspropaganda”--sophisticated information directed at influential opinion leaders and policy
shapers. Examples abound. In the US: American Economic Institute for Public Policy Research;
Brookings Institution; Business Roundtable; Conference Board; Heritage Foundation; Hoover
Institute; and the Institute for Policy Studies. In Canada: Canada West Foundation; C.D. Howe
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Institute; Fraser Institute; Institute for Research on Public Policy. In Australia: Committee for
Economic Development in Australia. In Great Britain: the Institute of Economic Affairs.
These advocacy organizations, less dedicated to the conventional think-tank role of
independent scholarly research, analysis and policy formation, are very evidently engaged in the
process of political persuasion by working to impose their own brand of ideology. A major
technique, according to Carey, is “to inundate relevant debate with an endless steam of books
and research reports” (p. 90), an instance of the classic strategy to overwhelm targeted
readerships with impressively assembled information combined with that of steering opinion
formation. In this way, they move into the sphere of propaganda practice: “they have come to
resemble interest groups and political action committees by pressuring decision makers to
implement politics compatible with their ideological beliefs….[and] are deeply committed to
imposing their ideological agenda on the electorate.” (Abelson, 1998, 537-538) As one institute
director tellingly conceded, advocacy think tanks “don’t want to stimulate public dialogue,
they’re out to impose their own monologue” (cited in Abelson, 1998, p. 538). Carey (1997, 106)
quotes a former head of the American Heritage Foundation as saying that “it takes an institution
to help popularize and propagandize an idea--to market an idea.’ Carey also believes these
institutions are devilishly effective: he credits them with contributing to the emergence of
Margaret Thatcher-style conservatism, the promotion of corporate commercialism, the reduction
of union power and the defeat of labor-law reform in United States, and “the closing of the
American mind.” (pp. 93-95)
This admittedly brief glimpse of think-tank activity is instructive: through the evidence of
their processes and reports, they stand in larger and clearer outlines as apparent instances of the
interplay between the use of information and research and the belief-structuring core of
propaganda.4 At the same time, think tanks illustrate the sophistication and the complex
panoply of epistemic types in this age of propaganda.
Conclusion
Propaganda is difficult to identify because of its ambiguous, deep-structured epistemological
linkages. It is self-disguising because it parades so freely and easily within the information
order itself. In this paper, I have argued that propaganda, typically defined in terms of surface
episodes such as skewed language, belief change and thought control, commands far greater
epistemological amplitude and diversity than that. On the contrary, propaganda processes and
messages incorporate a complex range of dissembling uses and practices in relation to the
manifold of cognition. Characteristically, propaganda thrives on confusion and informationoverload; it relies upon the dissembling use of facts and truths; it poses as information and
understanding; it subordinates truth to the lesser modalities of attention, credibility and utility; it
accords the highest premium to the state of actually induced belief; and it marshals an impressive
battery of para-epistemic talents and devices. This cluster of epistemic disservices does more to
situate propaganda than any other assortment of psychological descriptions, techniques or
persuasion effects. Rather, it is this array of epistemic deficits, disclosed through an
4

For an examination of how other para-epistemic devices also function in-text, see my chapter, “Smoke and
Mirrors: A Confirmation of Jacques Ellul’s Theory of Information Use in Propaganda.” In Ted J. Smith, ed.,
Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective. 1989. New York: Praeger. Pp. 151-163.
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epistemological analysis, that initially constitutes and identifies the phenomenon we call
‘propaganda’. In short, propaganda is originally, primarily and ineluctably a philosophical
concept. The popular notion that propaganda involves the manipulation of 1 perceptions and
beliefs, then, is not false, but it is a woefully incomplete reflection of its inherent epistemic
complexity and diversity. It is an equally inadequate prophylactic: Not to appreciate
propaganda’s epistemological amplitude leaves us at the mercy of those who do.
Looking beyond, I think that the epistemology of propaganda also provides at least a prima
facie case that an entrenched climate of propaganda is an unethical state of affairs. That, too, I
submit, requires yet another philosophical sortie into propaganda analysis.
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